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Coordination of a power system with the phasor measurement devices (PMUs) in real time on the
load and generation sides is carried out within the context of smart grid studies. Power systems
equipped with information systems in a smart grid pace with external security threats. Developing
a smart grid which can resist against cyber threats is considered indispensable for the uninterrupted
operation. In this study, a secure two way secure communication methodology underpinned by
a chaos-based encryption algorithm for PMU devices is proposed. The proposed system uses the
IEEE-14 busbar system on which the optimum PMU placement have been installed. The proposed
hyperchaotic system based encryption method is applied as a new security methodology among
PMU devices. The success of results is evaluated by the completeness of data exchange, durations,
the complexity of encryption-decryption processes and strength of cryptography using a microcom-
puter based implementation. The results show that the proposed microcomputer-based encryption
algorithms can be directly embedded as encryption hardware units into PMU and PDC devices
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which have very fast signal processing capabilities taking into considerations which the acceptable
delay time for power system protection and measuring applications and quality metering applica-
tions are 2ms and 10ms respectively. While proposed algorithms can be used in TCP or UDP over
IP based IEEE C37.118, IEC 61850 and IEC 61850-90-5 communication frameworks, it can also
be embedded into electronic cards, smartcards, or smart tokens which are utilized for authentication
among smart grid components.
Keywords:
Smart grid, microcomputers, microcomputer-based encryption, Phasor Measurement Unit
(PMU).
1. Introduction
A smart grid is defined as the provision of conventional electric power grids with modern infor-
mation technologies. For smart grids, the most fundamental goal can be explained as the achieve-
ment of economic and clean energy generation on a global scale [1, 2]. Conventional power grids
are currently being equipped with intelligent devices and systems which in general are data collect-
ing devices, distribution controller units, data manager, electric market monitoring systems, remote
terminal units, circuit breakers, human machine interface equipment, network management tools
and routers, network concentrators, phasor measuring units, smart meters and protection relays [3].
These devices function in risky decision making operations such as energy cut-off, commissioning,
load shedding play crucial roles in fulfilling the desired operations as well as monitoring and mea-
suring activities in the grid. The installation of such devices makes power systems vulnerable to
external cyber threats. If the two-way communication is blocked due to a cyber-attack there may
be unforeseeable damages in the grid. Therefore, developing security tools which are resistant to
cyber threats is indispensable. Having the grid resistant to cyber threats is a strategic precaution to
prevent unforeseeable damages in the event that two-way communication is blocked.
The security concept in the smart grid should be regarded within a wide range, as to the grids
consisting of a various type of communication systems such as GSM networks, fiber optic lines,
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Wimax, RS-232 and RS-485, cable lines, radio frequency lines and power system communication
lines [4]. The developing of high-security hardware and computing infrastructure to ensure that
all these hardware and systems work reliably is a matter of working separately within smart grid
operations.
By using various and these complex infrastructures, the synchrophasor technology is used to
monitor and control the realtime power system condition by using synchrophasor measurements
across large geographical areas in real-time with very low latency. These measurements are driven
by IEEE C37.118 and IEC 61850 synchrophasor communication frameworks whose security are
crucial as any incorrect information can cause severe damage to physical equipments. However
nearly all these communication frameworks have no built-in security mechanism and they have
restricted communication to only the local network. Among these communication frameworks,
we consider that IEC 61850 is a complete communication system that addresses modeling of power
system components, abstracting of services and communication protocols [5].. But only IEC 61850-
90-5 communication framework uses built-in encryption algorithm and periodic refreshing of secret
keys which can easily detect unauthorized modifications [6]. On the other hands, IEC 61850-90-5
communication framework has three times larger packet size due to metadata and carrying complete
decoding information in each packet compared to IEEE C37.118.1 and IEEE C37.118.2 frame-
works.
Today, various state of art methodologies have started to be used for enhancing the security
level of power grids. One of the important applications in grid security is to connect each grid com-
ponent under a Software Defined Network(SDN) in which its configuration is specified according
to power system component vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks [7]. The symmetrical and asymmetric
encryptions based privacy and authentication methods are also currently used among PLC and RTU
units in grid automation systems [8]. Another security application in grid is based on control of
grid components, especially controlling the data package of PMUs, in regards to damaging data by
external or internal attacks or malfunction reasons by using Kalman filter method [9]. Protection
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against cyber attacks is also achieved by using secure VPN technology [10]. All these methods fulfil
quite complex and tightly linked rules to meet the specified security goals. Doing all this requires
high computational cost, high memory and power consumption. This prevents the spread of these
security systems and causes them to remain in a limited number of devices and regions. In this
context, chaotic stream ciphers can be considered as an alternative for block ciphers in regard to
both low complexity and low resource consumption [11].
The issues of chaos and chaotic systems are the most complex dynamic behavior known in
nonlinear systems. They are a field of science that helps explain nonlinear systems. Chaos-based
engineering applications have emerged and have resulted in significant improvements in control
[12, 13], communication [14], artificial intelligence [15, 16] and genetic algorithm [17] areas in the
recent years. They have been also used as a random number generator [18, 19, 20] in cyber security
applications like encryption [21, 22, 23] and data hiding [24]
In this work, a novel microcomputer-based with a hyperchaotic system encryption method is
proposed to allow PMU devices to communicate with each other in a secure way in the smart grid.
According to our best knowledge, this is the first use of microcomputer-based encryption in a smart
grid environment. The proposed security methodology is based on a cryptographic engine ensuring
a secure communication layer for PMU and Phasor Data Concentrator(PDC) components. For this
purpose, via an application server software, which communicates with IEEE C37.118.1 compliant
PMU devices via the WireShark platform in realtime, is also developed. The results are evaluated by
the completeness of data exchange, encryption-decryption durations and strength of cryptography.
The results show that very fast and complex encryption capabilities of the proposed microcomputer
based encryption method can be easily used for ensuring secure communication among smart grid
components which have very narrow time intervals like PMUs.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, methodologies for modern power system
analysis is introduced, in Section 3, a novel security methodology for smart grids is given. In Section
4, the nonlinear system used in the proposed method and its dynamical analysis are presented.
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Section 5 is devoted to random number generator design and its statistical tests are presented in
Section 6. The details of PMU data encryption application and its security analysis are also provided
in this section. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 7.
2. Methodologies For Modern Power System Analysis
The coordination and reliability of the power system depend upon establishing a harmony be-
tween power and information infrastructure to create a real time two-way communication network
in the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity. Two-way communication technolo-
gies, control systems, and computer processing are key for smart grids. Advanced sensors, meters,
programmable relays and automated feeder switches are some of modern pieces of equipment used
in smart grids. Healthy operation of the power system depends on measurements of operational data
at sub- stations continuously. Within this context, it can be said that PMUs are widely acknowledged
as one of the most promising developments in the field of real-time monitoring of power systems.
The ability of PMUs to calculate synchronized phasors for voltages and currents instantaneously
and more accurately has encouraged their consistent proliferation in power system networks all
over the world.
2.1. Phasor Calculations and Principles of Phasor Measurement Units
2.1.1. Phasor Calculations
Phasor calculations of a power bus within a pure sinusoidal signal is given as
x (t)=Xmcos (ωt + φ) (1)
where ω and φ the resemble frequency of signal in radians per second and phase angle in
radians, respectively, while Xm is the peak amplitude of the signal. Figure 1 represents all parts of
a pure sinusoidal signal.
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Figure 1: A sinusoid (a) and its representation as a phasor (b). The phase angle of the phasor is arbitrary, as it depends
upon the choice of the axis t = 0.
Phasor representation is only possible for a pure sinusoid signal. In practice a waveform is often
corrupted with other signals of different frequencies. Extracting a single frequency component of
the signal, Fourier transform is used. For sampled data extraction discrete (DFT) or fast transform
(FFT) is used [25]. A x(t) sinusoid signal with frequency kf0 representation into Fourier series is
shown as follows;












Here, the Fourier series coefficients ak and bk measure the amount of cos(2πkf0t) and sin(2πkf0t)















Using the relationship of the Fourier series coefficients with DFT, the phasor representation of
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where N is the number of samples in the data window, n is the sample number, xn is the input







xn {cos (knθ)−jsin (knθ)} (7)

















Finally Xk is used to represent the phasor in most of the phasor computations. Phasor calcula-
tion is a continuous process so that updating phasor estimation as newer data samples are acquired.









x(n+1)+r {cos (nθ)−jsin (nθ)} (9)
In Eq. (9), r = -1,1,2,3,.. when r = -1, x0 sample is present on the right hand side but when r =
0, there is no x0 sample even if total number of samples i.e. N remains same.
Figure 2: Non-recursive update of phasor estimates with N sample windows.
As seen in Figure 2, phasor 1 is calculated with samples n = 0,...,N-1, while phasor 2 is cal-
culated with samples n =1,2,...,N. θ is the angle between successive samples based on the period of
the fundamental frequency. Here, n is the sample number and N is the number of samples in data
window. The phasor calculations are performed fresh for each window without using any data from







(xN+r−xr) {cosnθ − jsinnθ}
(10)
In Eq. (10), r = 0,1,2,3,. when r represents the present state, (r-1) represents the past state. As
seen in Eq.10, recursive estimation current output, XN+r, depends on the previous output, XN+(r−1),
and the current input, xN+r. Recursive phasor estimation is faster compared to non-recursive phasor
estimation as phasor calculation is not performed in each step. If the sine wave is not continuous
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there is a small error in phasor updating. Then in case of recursive phasor estimation, this small
error is accumulated resulting in much larger error over time.
2.1.2. Principles of Phasor Measurement Units
PMUs which are equipped with global positioning systems(GPS) receivers, take highly pre-
cise measurements of voltages and currents within defined time-stamps. Here, the GPS receivers
coordinate the synchronization of the several current and voltage measurements [26]. PMUs use re-
cursive algorithm for calculating symmetrical components of voltage and current like symmetrical
component distance relay (SCDR)[27].
The GPS [28] is a system of 36 satellites to produce time signals at the earth’s surface. 24
satellites are used each time for generating time signals. A GPS receiver measures distance using
the travel time of radio signals.1 microsecond precision is a suitable range of measuring power
frequency voltages and currents [27].
Since the introduction of PMUs to power systems, power system designers have been looking
for using the ability of PMUs in order to observe the system in a better way. Today, gathering and
merging information of PMUs are the best fault detection method in power transmission lines [28].
Processings data of PMUs are used as improving for stability coordinations [29], power system state
estimation [30], remedial action schemes [31] and disturbance monitorings [32]. On the other hand,
linearization mainly occurs when the state vector, as well as the PMU measurements are expressed
in rectangular coordinates.
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2.1.3. IEEE 14 Bus Model and PMU Placement Algorithm
It can be stated that the most important condition of increasing reliability and stability of a
power system depends on establishing a continuous and accurate measurement system. Kirchhoff’s
current and voltage laws are based on the fundamental principle that electrical quantities are phasors.
Similarly, it is possible to assume that the electrical signal is moving at the speed of light and that
the instantaneous voltage and current value of the system are possible by combining all voltage and
current phasor measurements taken with an accurate timer. PMU devices, which are customized as
phasor measuring devices in power systems, can detect the voltage and current phasor information
of the grid. The optimum placement of PMU devices should be considered due to the fact that a
great economic cost is required for installation of PMUs at every busbar in a power system [33, 34].
Instead of installing PMUs to every busbar of the power system, the busbars with high dynamics
and intense variability of conditions are chosen for installation. In this context firstly, the placement
of PMU devices on IEEE-14 bus system has been established by depth first search method [35,
36, 37, 38]. In this study, an IEEE-14 busbar system is used and the optimum PMU placement is
installed on studied busbar system. Then after, a microcomputer-based with a hyperchaotic system
encryption method is proposed as a new security methodology among PMU devices.
The open source PSAT power flow analysis tool is used for the placement of the secure
communication-based PMUs in the most suitable number of the IEEE-14 busbar system. According
to the depth first search method, the number of PMU devices that are placed is 6 and the most-
suitable busbars for PMU placement are the busbars {1, 4, 6, 8, 10 and 14}, respectively. Figure 3
shows the placement of PMUs on the IEEE-14 busbar power system.
Thanks to the use of these devices, it is determined that 16 current phasors can be measured on
the studied power system which consists of 14 busbars and 20 lines. The list of measurable phasor
lines of the PMU installed power system is given in Table 1, respectively.
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Figure 3: IEEE-14 Busbar PMU Built-in Model with Depth First Search Algorithm
Table 1: Measurable Phasor Lines of PMU Installed IEEE-14 Busbar System
1-2 Line 4-5 Line 6-11 Line 9-10 Line
1-5 Line 4-7 Line 6-12 Line 9-14 Line
2-4 Line 4-9 Line 6-13 Line 10-11 Line
3-4 Line 5-6 Line 7-8 Line 13-14 Line
Similarly, another kind of IEEE test system can be used for case studies. In such a test scenario,
the most important difference would be to determine the number of PMUs that would allow full
monitoring of the system and to define appropriate PMU and PDC data exchange procedures within
the IEEE C37.118.1 protocol [39]. For example, in the case of IEEE-39, IEEE-118 and IEEE-
300 were used as a test system, only a different data exchange scenario would be created over the
placement of 14, 39 and 73 PMU devices, respectively which would provide full monitoring of the
studied test system using some optimal placement algorithms [40]. Figure 4 shows the structure of
the data packet of an IEEE C37.118.1 compliant PMU device. The data packet structure includes
the device ID, the GPS timestamp, the second fraction, user defined flag commands to send the
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packet within the communication protocol standards, the phasor data, the rate of data and 16 bit
CRC data integrity controller. The phasor data consists of frequency (f), voltage magnitude (m V),
voltage phase angle (δ V), current magnitude (m I) and current phase angle (δ I) of the busbar.
Figure 4: IEEE C37.118.1 Compliant PMU Package Definition
3. A Novel Security Methodology For Smart Grids
Getting a correct phasor calculation in the studied IEEE-14 busbar system depends on an ap-
propriate placing of PMU devices with adequate numbers. A correct phasor calculation depends also
on an effective and proper data communication of PMU devices with each other. In this study, in-
stead of acquiring durations and package latencies for the completion of one full phasor calculation,
we have especially focused on a stream based communication which used for revealing encryption
success of data communication among one PMU to PDC devices. Here, the built-in PMU devices at
the IEEE-14 busbar system communicate by using the IEEE C37.118.1 synchronous phasor com-
munication protocol with TCP/IP support. The PDC unit which is responsible for collecting all
PMUs data in grid uses IEEE C37.118.1 protocol. In this study, the Wireshark platform is only re-
sponsible for interfacing data repository of PMU devices via a predetermined IP and socket address.
A client-base application at PMU sides and a server-base application software at PDC side handles
together the microcomputer-based hyperchaotic encryption processes of captured PMU data.
As seen in Fig.5, the Rasp3 unit operates as one of the PMU devices that encrypts the digital
phasor packet data in harmony with IEEE C37.118.1 protocol using the chaos encryption engine.
While connecting remained PMU units on IEEE-14 bus system except the for Rasp3, the PDC
server performs microcomputer-based encryption by gathering data using the Wireshark platform.
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The encryption and decryption processes are performed by the client and server using the proposed
microcomputer-based cryptographic engine.
Figure 5: Overall PMU Based Chaotic Cryptography Scheme
As seen in Fig.6, studied realtime data acqusition of PMU devices are acquired by IEEE
C37.118.1 compliant WireShark platform. The application server both manages PMU and PDC
sides with a chaotic cryptographic engine.
PDC server is responsible for determining appropriate inital conditions for the chaotic system
and other parameters for secure communication. The communication is carried out with sessions
in which 1Mbit random numbers generated by the chaotic system are used in the stream cipher. To
facilitates this secure communication PDC, first, generates random numbers using 5D hyperchaotic
system and tests them against NIST-800-22 statistical tests for randomness. Then it sends these
parameters to PMU as a part of cryptographic key. PMU unit uses the parameters to generate the
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Figure 6: Studied IEEE C37.118.1 Frames Captured by Wireshark Network Protocol Analyzer Software
same sequence using the same chaotic system. Then, PMU data is encrypted with a stream cipher
by means of the tested random numbers.
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4. The Used Nonlinear System And Its Dynamical Analysis
In this study, a 5D hyperchaotic Lorenz system are used [41, 42, 43].The 5D hyperchaotic
system and its dynamical analysis are given in this section. Equilibrium points, lyapunov and bifur-
cation analysis are examined for dynamical analysis. Also, phase portraits are shown in section V.
5D hyperchaotic Lorenz system is set as follows:
ẋ = −σ (x− y) + w
ẏ = rx− y − xz − w
ż = −βz + xy
u̇ = −xz + pw
ẇ = qy
(11)
where w is the fifth state variable and q is a positive real parameter. The 5-D system (11) has
three positive, one negative and one zero Lyapunov exponents.
The equilibria of five dimensional hyperchaotic Lorenz system (11) can be found by assuming
ẋ = 0, ẏ = 0, ż = 0, u̇ = 0, ẇ = 0 and solving the following equation:

−σ(x− y) + w = 0
rx− y − xz − w = 0
−βz + xy = 0
−xz + pw = 0
qy = 0.
(12)
Thus, this system has only zero equilibrium point: E0 (0, 0, 0, 0, 0). The Jacobian matrix of




−σ σ 0 1 0
r −1 0 0 −1
0 0 −β 0 0
0 0 0 p 0
0 q 0 0 0

(13)
We study the dynamics around the original equilibrium point E0 when the critical bifurcation






λ3 + 11λ2 + (q − 270)λ+ 10q
)
= 0 (14)
By using Wolf algorithm [44] Lyapunov exponents of the 5-D hyperchaotic system are calcu-
lated as 0.4580, 0.3371, 0.0415, 0.0000, 12.5046.
For the values of p > 0 and q < 2970, the only equilibrium E0 is an unstable saddle-node point
due to the presence of eigenvalues with positive real parts.
The bifurcation diagrams are also inspected to identify the chaos in the simulations. The vi-
sualization of dynamic behaviors and solutions of 5D hyperchaotic system are gathered by using
Matlab ODE45 solver and the phase portraits of the hyperchaotic system are depicted in Fig. 7
which shows the bifurcation diagrams in terms of p parameter varying between 7.5 and 2.5 values,
by keeping the other parameters fixed. The initial states of the 5D hyperchaotic Lorenz system are
determined as x(0) = 0, y(0) = −0.01, z(0) = 9, u(0) = 1 and w(0) = 0. For a step size of 0.005,
the chaos appears in two regions where parameter p is less than −1.5 and it is greater than 1.
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Figure 7: Bifurcation diagram for p parameter varies between −8 and 3.
In Figure 8a and 8b , it is also revealed that the system falls into hyperchaotic situation as it
can be seen that it has distinct features in its Lyapunov exponents. In this context bifurcation and
Lyapunov exponent diagrams confirm each other.
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5. Random Number Generator Design And Its Statistical Test
5.1. RNG design with a 5D hyperchaotic system
Many chaotic systems are used to generate pseudo random numbers as a source of entropy
because they are complex and very sensitive to the initial conditions. In this section, an RNG design
is proposed for PMU data encryption which is implemented in Raspberry 3.
A 5D hyperchaotic system developed in the proposed RNG design is given in Equation 11,
where σ, r, β, p, q are the parameters and x, y, z, u, w are the state variables. To visualize dynamic
behaviors and solutions of the proposed 5D hyperchaotic system, the differential equations given
in Eq. 11 are worked out using Matlab ode45 function. The obtained phase portraits of 5D hyper-
chaotic system are depicted in Fig. 9 for x, y, z and x, y, w. For this experiment, the parameters
are set to σ = 10, r = 28, β = 8/3, p = 2 and q=8 as well as the initial state is chosen as
(0,−0.01, 9, 1, 0).
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Figure 8: The Lyapunov exponents of 5D hyperchaotic system for p parameter varies between a) −8 and 3, b)−1.5 and
2.5.
RNG design steps using the proposed 5D hyperchaotic system are given in Algorithm 1. As
it can be seen in the algorithm, for RNG design, parameters and initial values of the hyperchaotic
system are needed. Any change in these parameters and initial values results in different random
numbers. Therefore initial conditions are crucial in RNG. Next, the time step (∆h) is determined
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Figure 9: The phase portraits of 5D hyperchaotic system for x, y, z (a) and x,y,w (b)
in order to discretize the hyperchaotic time series using Runga-Kutta-4 (RK4) method. Then, the
obtained floating numbers based on outputs of separate from each set of bits (x, y, z, u and w) are
converted to 32 bit binary numbers [45]. The last 16 bits of these binary numbers which must pass
NIST-800-22 randomness test are used to generate 1Mbit random numbers are then used in one
communication session. For this aim, a 1Mbit is extracted from the last 16 bits of each output and
tested. If these numbers do not pass the test, then the last 8 bits of each output is considered for the
test.
To prove the randomness of the generated number series NIST-800-22 tests are employed. The
NIST-800-22 have 16 different tests such as runs, discrete Fourier transform and linear-complexity
test. These tests need a minimum of 1 MBit binary numbers. For successful results, the P value must
be greater than 0.001 for all NIST-800-22 tests [46]. The NIST-800-22 are applied to the random
numbers generated in step 11.
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5.2. Statistical Tests
The NIST-800-22 tests results of obtained random numbers from y, z, u and w are shown in
Table 2. The random numbers obtained from y, z, u and w successfully passed all the tests, but the
random numbers are only used from w for PMU data encryption.
ENT is another randomness test that has five different tests, which define the randomness of
a bit sequences, proposed by Walker [47]. The tests include arithmetic mean, entropy, correlation,
Chi-square and Monte Carlo pi estimation [48]. The average values of the ENT test results of the
random numbers from y(8), z(16), u(8) and w(16) are shown in Table 3 in which can be seen the
successful results for all tests.
The proposed microcomputer-based with a hyperchaotic system method is compared with
some studies in the literature in Table 4. When the results in the table are considered, it is seen
that the numbers obtained provide randomness for ENT tests. The proposed method produces good
results in general. Stoyanov et al have the best results in arithmetic mean test because the ideal
result is 127.5. But, the entropy test result is not good according to other methods except from [49].
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Table 2: RNG NIST-800-22 test results for y, z, u and w outputs
Statistical Tests y(8) z(16) u(8) w(16)
Frequency (Monobit) Test 0.2142 0.9712 0.2974 0.0945
Block-Frequency Test 0.7545 0.7000 0.0581 0.4610
Cumulative-Sums Test 0.3829 0.4886 0.3897 0.1016
Runs Test 0.6075 0.9904 0.8611 0.8342
Longest-Run Test 0.4854 0.9275 0.9225 0.4248
Binary Matrix Rank Test 0.7728 0.1876 0.5529 0.2004
Discrete Fourier Transform Test 0.1323 0.9414 0.4140 0.0289
Non-Overlapping Templates Test 0.3973 0.0168 0.0202 0.0533
Overlapping Templates Test 0.5982 0.8957 0.5830 0.7414
Maurer’s Universal Statistical Test 0.2457 0.7903 0.3924 0.7780
Approximate Entropy Test 0.7247 0.9430 0.9008 0.6912
Random-Excursions Test 0.2953 0.6938 0.8843 0.4569
Random-Excursions Variant Test 0.6888 0.6522 0.6050 0.3386
Serial Test-1 0.6993 0.9187 0.0464 0.8103
Serial Test-2 0.2423 0.4510 0.0129 0.9127
Linear-Complexity Test 0.9728 0.2036 0.6666 0.6098
Entropy, correlation and Monte Carlo test results are the best in [50] with 7.9999, 0.000108 and
3.14062, respectively. [51] and [49] haven’t the Chi-square test result. In the proposed method, test
results are suitable and acceptable for cryptographic application because of the random numbers
passed all tests.
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Table 4: Comparing the ENT test results of the proposed method with different works
Arithmetic mean Entropy Correlation Chi-square Monte carlo
y(8) 127.3353 7.9985 -0.0051725 253.6648
3.1396
error=-0.00062338)
z(16) 127.1994 7.9985 0.0031184 265.2769
3.149
error=0,0023713
u(8) 127.322 7.9985 0.0030067 262.594
3.1383
error=-0,0010512
w(16) 127.3249 7.9985 -0.00061494 252.6899
3.1352
error=-0,0020291
Stoyanov et al. [51] 127.5013 7.9975 -0.000147 -
3.140569
error=0.03
Seetharam et al. [49] 122.885 7.7133 -0.058927 -
3.088126
error=1.70
Akhshani et al. [50] 127.7714 7.9999 0.000108 255.19
3.14062
error=0.031
6. PMU Data Encryption Application And Its Security Analysis
6.1. PMU Data encryption application with 5D hyperchaotic system
Mobile random number generators(RNGs) are important for real-time stream cipher based
applications. Nowadays, some RNGs are implemented by using high-cost hardware like FPGA,
computers, etc. In this work, a low-cost RNG is designed by means of 64-bit quad-core ARM
Cortex-A53 microprocessor based ”Raspberry Pi 3” (1.2 GHz, 4 cores, 1 GB RAM) microcomputer.
In this section, PMU data encryption and decryption system using the RNG designed with 5D
hyperchaotic system and passed all the NIST-800-22 tests is presented. The block diagram of the
encryption processes is given in Fig. 10. One PMU generates 108 byte data. Within the application
server, digital chaos keys are created and ready for use in packet encryption. The encrypted packets
generated by the encryption are sent back to the application server via the Ethernet port of Raspberry
Pi.
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Figure 10: Microcomputer-based with a Hyperchaotic System Encryption Process
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An example of PMU data consists of 108 characters is as follows. Also, original and encrypted
PMU data input / output ports in Raspberry Pi 3 is given Fig.11.
aa01003600f14893334f003d70a4080047c3659cbfc8e73947c3631cbfc8e52b47c365574027a0d447c3686
43f065a850000000042a9
Figure 11: PMU Data Input / Output Ports in Raspberry Pi 3
In the encryption application, the PMU data is converted to binary format. In Fig. 12 some bit
of binary 864 bit original PMU data series, produced from Raspberry Pi 3 output, on oscilloscope
screen are given. The binary PMU data is encrypted with the tested RNG which obtained 5D Lorenz
hyperchaotic system using a stream cipher scheme based on XOR.
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Figure 12: Original PMU Data
Some bit of encrypted binary 864 bit PMU data is shown Fig. 12. The size of the encrypted
data is same as 864 bit, because of the encryption process is done for bit by bit.
Figure 13: Encrypted PMU Data
Also, PMU data consists of all encrypted characters is as follows. Some of them are shown in




In the decryption process, the same random numbers used in the encryption are needed. The
parameters and initial values of the hyperchaotic system are very important. If the same random
numbers cannot be obtained it will cause different values and true PMU data decryption will be
impossible. After true random numbers and use of XOR, the decrypted PMU data can be taken.
6.2. Security Analyses and Performance Assessment
6.2.1. Histogram analysis
In the histogram analysis, rates of 1s and 0s in the original and encrypted data are evaluated.
There are 864 bits data as 1s and 0s in a PMU data. If the difference between 1s and 0s is very little
or nothing, the result of encryption is quite successful. Histogram distribution (number of 1s and
0s) of PMU data is given in Fig. 14 for original and encrypted data. The number of 0s is 690, the
number of 1s is 174 in original PMU data. Encrypted PMU data bit series contains 425 0s and 439
1s. Difference between bits decreased from 516 to 14 after the encryption.
Figure 14: Histogram distribution of PMU Data
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6.2.2. Key length analysis
In encryption applications, the length of the key also determines the security level. The num-
bers of differential equations, initial values and system parameters make key lengths longer. For
one variable nonlinear system, the length of the key can be 1014 values. The chaotic system (11)
in this paper has 5 (x, y, z, u and w) 1070 and 5 (σ, r, β, p and q ) 1070 different values; thus, 10140
key length in total. The encrypted PMU data with the proposed chaotic system (11) will be highly
secure because of the enormous key length. The decryption of PMU data only with this long key
reveals the security level of the proposed system.
6.2.3. Key sensitivity analysis
Chaotic systems have very complicated and sensitive dynamic features, so they have come into
prominence also in security applications such as cryptology and data hiding. The same parameters
are needed for the decryption in many applications, and thus, the chaotic system and all of its prop-
erties must be clearly known like initial conditions and parameters. In a very tiny mistake cannot
be reached the true results and will lead to different results because of a little mistake will cause
another one.
6.2.4. Encryption-decryption times and memory usage
Besides little encryption-decryption time, memory usage and usability in real-time applica-
tions, another significant criterion is speed. We used 64-bit quad-core ARM Cortex-A53 micropro-
cessor based ”Raspberry Pi 3” which have 1.2 GHz, 4 cores, 1 GB RAM microcomputer board in
this work and compared some stream cipher algorithms with our chaos-based method. Table 5 de-
tails the encryption, decryption times and memory usage. Salsa20 algorithm spends the most time
for encryption and decryption. Encryption time is 311 ms while decryption time is 314 ms. Also
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considering the size of memory it occupies, one can conclude that it is quite disadvantageous for
real-time applications.









Chaos 0.097 0.113 408
RC4 84.3 85 6396
Trivium 30 30.5 74448
Salsa20 311 314 201116
Pycube 39.3 40 5767
Trivium method produces good results in terms of time criteria. But, memory usage is not
good according to Pycube algorithm. In the microcomputer-based technique, on the other hand,
encryption-decryption times and memory usage are very good according to other methods. Encryp-
tion time is 0.097 ms while decryption time is 0.113 ms. Memory usage is 408 byte in our method.
These results are very suitable for real-time applications, especially in smart grids.
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7. Conclusion
In this study, it is the first time in the literature using microcomputer-based with a hyperchaotic
system encryption algorithm for allowing PMU devices used in smart grid to make secure two-
way communication. The proposed security methodology is realized into a cryptographic engine
ensuring a secure communication layer between PMU and PDC components via a developed appli-
cation server software. The application server communicates with IEEE C37.118.1 compliant PMU
devices via the WireShark platform in realtime. The results are evaluated by the completeness of ac-
curate data exchange among PMU packages, total time durations of different encryption algorithms,
the complexity of encryption-decryption processes by using sensitivity and histogram analysis and
finally strength of cryptography with NIST tests.
The results show that measured total delay of 0.21 ms including both encryption and decryp-
tion durations, the proposed microcomputer-based encryption algorithms can provide a shorter de-
lay while performing encryption and can be directly embedded as encryption hardware units into
encrypted protocol of IEC 61850-90-5 compliant PMU and PDC devices which obligated to ac-
ceptable delay time below 3 ms for power system protection and measuring functioning. While
proposed algorithms can be used in TCP or UDP over IP based IEEE C37.118, IEC 61850 and IEC
61850-90-5 communication frameworks, it can also be embedded into electronic cards, smartcards,
or smart tokens which are utilized for authentication among smart grid components.
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